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 1
Introduction 
 
The crisis in Asia has dominated economic, financial, and much business thinking for more 
than seven months. It looks set to continue to do so for an extended period. The effects on the 
countries concerned, on the region, and on New Zealand are all immediate questions. There 
are a host of others.  What caused the crisis? Was the cause the same in all the countries most 
affected? People talked about the contagion, but what were the mechanics of the crisis 
passing from  one country to another?  How are the societies, as  opposed to the financial 
markets and the traders, reacting? Will there be long-term  effects on political stability and 
security issues in the region? There are more.  
 
This paper is the first of occasional papers on the crisis which will be published by the 
International Trade Policy Research Centre in  the Commerce Division of Lincoln University. 
As a phenomenon the crisis is of academ ic interest but palpably of business interest as well. 
The series of papers will have m aterial of interest to specialists but will be presented in such 
a way that it is widely accessible to other readers as well.  
 
In such discussions there is always tension be tween the general and the specif ic. For the first 
in the series we have presented and analysed  the financial and econom ic sequence of events 
broadly. W e have also examined political instability and security factors broadly. But in 
examining the effect on New Zealand we have decided on a sector approach. In this paper we 
look as the effects on forestry. In the next paper we will deal with education.  
 
The financial economic, and trade analysis is given first, the examination of the effects on 
forestry second, and the political and security section is last.  
 
 
A Note on Sources and Methodology 
 
The sources for the financial and economic data are the most authoritative that we were able 
to find and are identified. We hope in tim e to widen the sources of useful data. The analysis is
of a current event and the only instant important sources are often to be found in newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television. Sometimes a news report will contain more up-to-date 
information on economic matters than is available from  a government, the world Bank, or the 
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International Monetary Fund. These two sources  are supplemented by personal contacts and 
from observations made while travelling. We are not in the business of prophecy on the 
crisis, as is Mr Lee Tai-m ing, a Hong Kong fo rtune-teller whose business, at HK$200  ($44) 
a time, is booming, according to the Far Eastern Economic Review .Yet we are aware that the 
duration of the crisis is critical to many business people and in a future paper we will make 
our own predictions on its likely length. In the meantime we do not think that growth will 
return to Asia as suddenly as light should return to Auckland.  
 
 
Financial and Economic 
 
The Asian econom ic crisis cam e about when investors, mainly local, lost confidence in the 
value of  their local currencies and switched investments at the margin into dollars. The 
causes of the Asian crisis originated in Asia but  are not confined to one country. This section 
discusses why the crisis occurred and why the impact has been so dramatic. First, some 
background information is given and factors leading to the crisis and market sentiment are 
discussed. 
 
Causes of the Crisis 
 
A major underlying cause of the crisis can be traced back to the early nineties when China, 
Vietnam and others realigned their policies and currencies to make themselves competitive in 
the non-communist sphere. These m oves included a 40% devaluation by China in 1994. The 
depreciation of the yen by 25% from  early 1995 to late 1996 was also significant, signalling 
deep political and structural stresses in the Japanese economy. The effect  of the fall of these 
two currencies put pressure on the external competitiveness on the rest of Asia, eroding 
external trade positions and causing trade deficits. 
 
Currency speculators believed that the Thai currency, the baht, was overvalued and started a 
series of speculative attacks on the baht. As a result, Thailand was the first country to face the 
crisis. Thailand had been one of the Asian economic success stories, enjoying strong 
economic growth over  the last few decades. It was, however, this high growth rate that 
contributed to Thailand’s undoing. The country has a moderate-wage/medium-skill labour 
force which attracted foreign direct investment to build plants manufacturing labour intensive 
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 goods such as electronic products for export to developed countries. Thailand was 
particularly attractive to foreign investors because its currency, the baht, was pegged to the 
US dollar. It remained com petitive by upgrading its chemical, automobile, electrical and 
electronic industries (Asian Development Bank, 1996). Thailand’s strong growth and 
sensible macroeconomic management, resulting in public sector fiscal surpluses, attracted 
large inflows of foreign capital. Most of this capital was in the form of short-term borrowing, 
especially after the creation of the Bangkok International Banking Facility in 1993. 
 
The Thai government, seeking political advantage,  engaged in excessive official spending. It 
also encouraged banks to lend generously for private real estate and other spending. The 
result was a building boom . Moreover, internal migration to the population centres created  
pressure to build infrastructure adding to more bank-financed speculative building 
programmes in the dom estic economy. This stimulated imports more than the term s of trade 
could sustain. The  result was a trade deficit wh ich grew quickly because of the currency was 
pegged to the appreciating US$ (which it does intermittently relative to other major 
currencies).  
 
The past success of the econom y added to a sense of denial that the country was heading for 
trouble. Although the IMF had warned of a crisis since the beginning of 1996 and 
macroeconomic indicators showed that the curre nt account deficit was unsustainably large, 
the high growth rates reduced any sense of urgency by the authorities for policy reform 
(Fischer, 1998). 
 
On 2 July, 1997, Thailand’s central bank abandoned the pegging of the baht in favour of a 
managed float. This started a chain of devalua tions across South-east Asian countries as they 
devalued to remain competitive with Thailand. A further force towards devaluation came 
from China, Vietnam  and others. As the com petitiveness of the Asian tigers fell, China and 
others took over export markets, leaving countries no option but to devalue to remain 
competitive. The problem for Thailand, which no longer had the confidence of investors, was 
that it could no longer rely on foreign investment to finance current account deficits. Fast 
running out of foreign reserves, the Thai government finally sought help from  the IMF. That 
help was approved on August 20, 1997. 
After the attack on the Thai baht, The Malaysian ringgit started to depreciate. The authorities 
decided not to raise interest rates. The ringgit has fallen by nearly a third against the US dollar 
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 since early July. The Malaysian stock market fell by nearly 60% from  its highest point in 
1997.  After a run of speculative attacks on the ringgit, the Malaysian Government delayed 
several m ulti-billion dollar construction projects and scaled back on some Commonwealth 
Games facilities. 
 
Feeling the pressure, the Indonesian currency, the rupiah, depreciated sharply, starting a 
crisis in Indonesia. Indonesia was affected for different reasons. Since 1970 the Indonesian 
economy had been one of the fastest growing among developing countries, real GDP growth 
averaging 7% annually. This has been attributed to high rates of investment and savings, 
facilitated through reasonable macro-economic management and increasingly market-driven 
trade regimes. As with other developing Asian countries, Indonesia’s growth came from  
labour intensive industry. Indonesia improved its health and education services and reduced 
poverty levels. 
 
Companies and banks took advantage of interest rate differentials, borrowing heavily 
overseas to finance domestic projects. However, the Indonesian economy suffered from  
domestic trade regulations and import monopolies which impeded economic efficiency and 
competitiveness. In common with a number of other countries, there was a lack of economic 
data. This increased investor uncertainty and adversely affected investor confidence. 
Therefore, like Thailand, Indonesia was not in a position to withstand external shocks and 
then had to contend with a major crisis. 
 
In Taiwan, considerably further north but feeling some of  the same strains, authorities 
stopped intervening, allowing the new Taiwan dollar to depreciate. This put pressure on the 
Hong Kong share market, which lost about half its value. The Hong Kong economy was 
already at risk because the government was tryi ng to defend its fixed exchange rate regime 
pegged to the appreciating US$. Other Asian countries had abandoned their pegs. Hong 
Kong’s financial institutions, exposed to property lending services, were linked closely to the 
sharemarket. The falling New Taiwan dollar contributed to the depreciation of the won,  the 
currency of  Taiwan’s closest competitor, South Korea.   
 
During 1995 and early 1996 the Korean economy had grown fast. Investments were large and 
productive capacity boomed. Government policy encouraged this growth giving incentives 
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 such as tax cuts, subsidies, and monopolistic rights to various industries. The major 
beneficiaries of these incentive schemes were the Chaebol or large conglomerates. 
 
In 1996 a cyclical downturn slowed export growth to 3% for that year. The factors 
responsible for this were weaker external demand, the collapse of computer chip prices, and  
a loss of competitiveness because of  the deprecation of the yen. Investment growth also 
slowed, partly reflecting the political uncertainty in the presidential election. As the 
productive capacity of businesses became under-utilised, the profits of companies eroded. 
Some firms made losses, resulting in dif ficulties in debt servicing on loans. When new bank 
loans were unavailable, a number of firms, including the large conglomerates of Hambo 
Steel, Jinro, Dianong, New Core Group and KIA motors, went bankrupt. 
 
As companies delayed or stopped servicing debt, the balance sheets of banks weakened,  
lowering overseas creditors’ confidence in Korean banks. Raising overseas borrowing 
premiums made it difficult to borrow money, even for government-owned banks. By mid- 
November a number of banks faced liquidity problems, some being close to insolvency. The 
South Korean Government and Bank of Korea injected money into the banks and made 
announcements to boost confidence. But confidence did not increase; nor did the economy 
stop deteriorating.  
 
The measures did not work for the following reasons: first, South Korea had excessive 
external short-term debts amounting to $US 100 billion or one-third of GDP. The fact that 
businesses were unable to service such a debt suggests that this level was excessive. 
Secondly, the Korean economy operates in the global marketing system  where confidence 
plays a crucial role especially in the supply of  marketing credit. A policy of saving insolvent 
banks did not boost confidence enough to gain external financing. Political uncertainty added 
to the lack of confidence, as did the failure to get parliamentary approval for nine financial 
sector reform bills in mid-November, 1997. 
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A Summary of the Causes of the Crisis 
 
High economic growth masked the problems a number of countries faced and it was not until 
export demand slowed  that the problem s were uncovered. A summary of the factors is listed 
below.  
  
 Banks lent excessive amounts of money to risky clients.  
 Assumptions about continued high growth meant that banks were not monitoring the 
quality of their loan portfolios adequately and the quality deteriorated. 
 Most Asian countries had either fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates against the floating US 
dollar. Many companies and banks had unhedged exchange rate exposure as they took 
advantage of domestic and international interest rate differentials. 
 The bulk of the overseas borrowing was short-term.  
 A feature of the financial system s of some countries was lack of bank supervision. Faulty 
credit assessment schemes and corruption made the lending process inefficient.  
 The lack of data and the lack of transparency at the microeconomic and  macroeconomic 
levels concealed the extent of the problems. 
 Structural reforms that should have been carried out to keep up with growing and 
increasingly sophisticated economies were not carried out.  Exchange rates policies that 
pegged currencies to the US dollar and to the yen resulted in inflexible external regimes 
that might have, at least partially, buffered the internal and external shocks that inevitably 
arise. 
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Table 1   
Sequence of Events 
 
Time Events 
Beginning 1994 China devalues its currency, the yuan 
1995 - 1996 Japanese yen depreciates 
1996 Periodic speculative attacks on the Thai baht 
January, 1997 Thai baht attacked by speculators 
May 15, 1997 Thailand introduces capital and exchange controls 
July 2, 1997 Thailand  changes the foreign exchange policy to a managed float. 
July 11, 1997 Philippines central bank widens  peso trading band 
Indonesia’s central bank expands intervention band 
July 14, 1997 Malaysia widens foreign currency trading band to reduce speculative 
pressure 
July, 1997 IMF approves extension for Philippines Extended Arrangement 
August 14, 1997 Indonesian central bank floats the rupiah 
August 20, 1997 IMF approves Thailand’s financial support package 
August, 1997 Korea defends fixed exchange rate by raising interest rates 
October 17, 1997 Taiwan allows New Taiwan dollar to depreciate 6% 
October 20, 1997 Korean authorities widen won trading band 10% 
November 5, 1997 IMF approves Indonesia’s financial support package 
December 4, 1997 IMF approves Korea’s financial support package 
 
Resolving the Crisis  
 
As discussed earlier, the central banks and governments of affected countries have 
implemented measures to address the crisis. Korea, Thailand and Indonesia and to a lesser 
extent the Philippines have requested help from the IMF which is supporting the programmes 
with finance packages that also include multilateral and bilateral credit packages. The 
different types of credit the IMF lends out are contained in table 2. 
 
Table 2 
 Types of IMF Credit 
 
Type of Credits Details 
Stand-By Arrangement or Extended 
Arrangement 
Where funds are made available for 
strengthening a country’s foreign reserve 
position. Interest rates are quoted at market 
rates, with 1 - 2 years maturity, extendable 
to 3 - 4 years 
Compensatory and Contingency 
 Financing Facility 
Short-term credit to developing nations 
 facing a decline in exports  
Structural Adjustment Facility Provides Funds to low-income members 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Also provides funds to low-income 
 members 
Systemic Transformation Facility Financial Transformation Facility 
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The packages approved by the IMF to Korea,  Indonesia and Thailand are all Stand-By 
Arrangements. The breakdown of the financial a ssistance to these countries is contained in 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
 Financial Support Packages 
(billions of US$) 
 
 Thailand Indonesia South Korea 
IMF 3.9 10.1 21.0 
World Bank 1.5 4.5 10.0 
Asian Development Bank 1.2 3.5 4.0 
United States 0.0 3.0 5.0 
Europe 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Japan 4.0 5.0 10.0 
Other 
(includes regional bilateral) 
6.5 8.2 2.0 
Total 17.1 34.3 57.0 
Source: Institute of International Finance 
 
 
As with any lending institution the IMF requires th at conditions be attached to loans and that 
countries be com mitted to using the loans for remedying economic problems appropriately, 
according to IMF guidelines.  
 
The guidelines in general terms usually contain the following conditions: 
 
 keeping interest rates high to encourage capital inflows. 
 freeing up exchange rates. 
 improving labour market flexibility. 
 relaxing foreign ownership rules. 
 removing trade barriers. 
 deregulating government laws to prom ote and ensure economic efficiency in the market, 
and 
 privatising government-owned businesses.  
 
So far the countries have committed themselves to adhering to the IMF conditions. However, 
because  the Indonesian economy has not recovered fast enough, the Indonesian Government 
is talking about reverting back to a fixed exchange rate system. 
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All three countries that applied for IMF support faced sim ilar problems. Thailand, Korea and 
Indonesia all suffered from a loss in market confidence, depreciating currencies, weak 
financial systems, excessive unhedged foreign borrowing in the domestic private sector, and 
a lack of transparency in the ties among  government, banks and businesses. All of these 
factors contributed to the crisis. 
 
Despite these similarities, these countries also had some significant differences. Thailand had 
an extremely large current account deficit of 8% of GDP; the South Korean current account 
was not as great as Thailand’s but it was getting worse; and Indonesia’s current account was 
at a manageable level of 3.25% of GDP. 
 
Thailand called the IMF for help when its central bank had nearly  run out of foreign 
reserves, Korea was not quite as bad as Thailand. Indonesia , on the other hand requested 
IMF help at an earlier stage of the crisis in early November. (Fischer, 1998). 
 
IMF packages have been criticised on the ground that that they are im posing conditions that 
are designed for economies with high inflation, high budget deficits, and public sector 
external debts and are therefore inappropriate because the Asian countries have had low 
inflation and the external debt is mainly held in the private sector. In addition, some people 
believe that the IMF packages were influen ced and written by Am erica to impose conditions 
that go beyond normal econom ic conditions to allow American companies into Asia and 
allow foreign banks to take over the financial sector (Khor, 1998). Although this view is 
rather extreme and that a ‘takeover’ is a most unlikely event, this sentim ent exists. However, 
there is a general feeling that Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia should stick with their IMF 
programmes to increase investor confidence. 
 
 
 10
Implications of the Crisis for New Zealand 
 
The effect on New Zealand exports will largely depend on how successful the Asian 
countries governments are in stabilising their economies and introducing credible structural 
reforms and trade liberalisation. The success of the IMF programmes is likely to be a 
contributing factor. 
 
New Zealand exports to Japan, Indonesia, and Thailand were all down for the December, 
1997, quarter from  sam e quarter the previous year. Exports to Korea, Hong Kong, China, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines rose. Annual New Zealand export earnings 
for 1997  from Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Thailand were down on the year ended 
December 1996, while exports increased compared to 1996 for China, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia and the Philippines (see Table 4). It is too early for these figures to reflect the full 
impact of the crisis.  
 
Table 4  
New Zealand Exports (FOB) to Asia 
 
Country Three months ended 
December 
Twelve months ended 
December 
 1996 1997 %  1996 1997 % 
 $(million) change $(million) change 
Japan 789.0 724.8 -8.1 3216.5 3055.0 -5.0 
Korea, Republic of 221.5 229.0 3.4 984.7 943.4 -4.2 
China, Peoples Republic of 121.2 135.5 11.8 536.9 582.6 8.5 
Hong Kong 149.0 151.1 1.4 663.3 581.2 -12.4 
Taiwan, Province of China 124.7 141.2 13.3 566.6 566.1 -0.1 
Malaysia 117.5 139.5 18.7 476.2 509.1 6.9 
Singapore 75.9 110.6 45.7 294.8 353.1 19.8 
Indonesia 88.0 67.4 -23.4 338.3 343.4 1.5 
Philippines 65.8 83.8 27.4 247.5 336.2 35.8 
Thailand 77.1 62.6 -18.7 270.7 261.4 -3.5 
Source: Statistics New Zealand. Note that the 1997 figures are provisional. 
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Tradenz outlined a number of the most important constraints to New Zealand’s export trade: 
 
 depreciation of currencies; 
 liquidity problems and the inability of companies to open letters of credit; 
 reduced consumer demand; 
 import substitution amongst manufacturers; and 
 campaigns aimed at frugality. 
 
Short-Term Impacts 
 
New Zealand exports to Asia can be expected to be affected by two major influences. 
Aggregate demand in Asia is expected to fall in 1998 and this will reduce the demand for 
imports from  all countries, including New Zealand. However, to the extent that the New 
Zealand dollar itself has depreciated against the US dollar and other major currencies (9.5% 
depreciation in the Trade Weighted Index since 30 June 1997) New Zealand is increasingly 
competitive in Asia. In one minor example, Lincoln University saw an increase in enrolments 
of Asian students at the end of February in part because it is thought students switched from  
the United States and other education markets. 
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Table 5 
Trade Weighted Index Base: June 1979= 100 
 
Date T.W.I 
30 June 1997 67.4 
31 July 1997 65.5 
30 August 1997 64.3 
30 September 1997 64.5 
31 October 1997 64.5 
30 November 1997 64.3 
31 December 1997 62.9 
31 January 1998 61.8 
25 February 1998 61.0 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
 
The IMF reforms on trade and investment in the affected countries are helping  to control the 
uncertain financial environment critical  to maintaining trade. The financial stability provided 
by the IMF allows importers to open more letters of credit. The IMF programmes allow 
importers in Asian countries to use more than $2 billion in export credit guarantees made 
available by United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
 
The current crisis is estimated to show signs of recovery in two to three years. The New 
Zealand economy is expected to recover in  early 1998 (NZIER, 1997). This will depend on a 
number of factors, including the ability of the IMF reform packages to boost confidence for 
investors. In the longer term  the trade liber alisation initiated by the IMF should allow New 
Zealand greater access to Asian markets. For example, Korea is streamlining import 
certification procedures by adopting harmonised standards on pesticide residue levels and 
eliminating import licensing practices on products. Korea is also elim inating trade subsidies, 
reducing high price supports for rice  and beef  and reducing num ber of agricultural products 
subject to tariff rate quotas (TRQs). 
 
Indonesia is elim inating monopolies, phasing out  all quantitative restrictions and other non-
tariff barriers, except those justified by health, safety, environmental and security concerns as 
permitted under  the W TO. It is reducing tari ffs on most imported food products from 20-40 
per cent to 5 percent and abolishing dairy domestic content regulations which discouraged 
imports, especially from New Zealand (USDA, 1998). 
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Thailand is elim inating tariffs and tariff rate quotas on a number of agricultural products, 
adopting harmonised import licensing procedures and establishing m ore transparent customs 
valuation procedures (USDA, 1998).  
 
 
Impact on NZ Industry: Forestry 
 
An analysis of reports in the popular press indi cates that several industry sectors have been 
particularly hard hit by the Asian economic crisis ( The Press, 6 January 1998, p.21).  These 
sectors include: agriculture, education, forestry and tourism.  As the intention of this 
discussion paper is to provide an in-depth look at consequences of the Asian economic crisis, 
we decided to focus on forestry. (Note: for the next discussion paper we will focus on 
education).   
 
The Importance of the Asian Market 
 
Forestry rem ains - despite the Asian economic crisis - New Zealand’s third-biggest export 
earner (after dairy products and meat) -see Table 6.  In particular, New Zealand is very reliant 
on Japan and Korea for wood exports. Together these two countries imported around $1 
billion worth of all wood exports, or 63% of all such exports for the year ended June 1997 - 
see Table 7.  Forty-nine per cent of all wood pulp exports go to either Japan or Indonesia - see 
Table 8.  In contrast, we are not so reliant on Asian countries for paper and paperboard 
exports (Australia imports 62% of our paper and paperboard; the next largest importer is 
Hong Kong at 8%) - see Table 9. Please note that all export statistics are sourced from  
Statistics New Zealand. [online] http://www.stats.govt.nz 
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Table 6 
Principal Exports (FOB, $millions) 
 
 Year ending 30 June 
 1995 1996 1997 
Beef & veal 1,161 1,054 992 
Lamb & mutton 1,197 1,337 1,503 
Total meat & edible offal 2,613 2,655 2,730 
 Milk, cream & yoghurt 1,405 1,481 1,738 
 Butter 726 860 918 
 Cheese 605 617 838 
Total dairy products 2,748 2,982 3,515 
Sawn timber & logs 1,158 1,091 1,140 
Total forest products 2,576 2,531 2,332 
Fish 1,118 1,142 1,026 
Fruit & vegetables 1,195 1,284 1,050 
Wool 1,253 1,034 947 
Unwrought aluminium 670 654 811 
Casein & caseinates 509 557 569 
Totals 20,925 20,721 21,033 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
NZ Exports of Wood, by Country 
(year ending June 1997, provisional statistics) 
 
Rank Country FOB 
($millions) 
% 
Share 
1 Japan 663.2 42.2 
2 Korea 333.8 21.2 
3 Australia 254.4 16.2 
4 U.S.A. 113.4 7.2 
5 Taiwan 64.6 4.1 
6 Philippines 36.6 2.3 
7 Hong Kong 26.7 1.7 
8 Thailand 17.0 1.1 
9 China 12.5 0.8 
10 India 9.8 0.6 
 All Countries 1,572.3  
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Table 8 
NZ Exports of Wood Pulp, by Country 
(year ending June 1997, provisional statistics) 
 
Rank Country FOB 
($millions) 
% 
Share 
1 Japan 106.2 29.8 
2 Australia 72.2 20.3 
3 Indonesia 68.2 19.1 
4 Korea 25.4 7.1 
5 Taiwan 23.4 6.6 
6 U.S.A. 17.0 4.8 
7 Malaysia 15.5 4.4 
8 Thailand 10.3 2.9 
9 Philippines 6.6 1.9 
10 China 4.5 1.3 
 All Countries 356.7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
NZ Exports of Paper & Paperboard, by Country 
(year ending June 1997, provisional statistics) 
 
Rank Country FOB 
($millions) 
% 
Share 
1 Australia 227.7 62.3 
2 Hong Kong 30.4 8.3 
3 Malaysia 19.2 5.3 
4 Singapore 12.2 3.4 
5 China 12.2 3.3 
6 Fiji 10.6 2.9 
7 Philippines 7.4 2.0 
8 Thailand 6.3 1.7 
9 U.S.A. 5.9 1.6 
10 New Caledonia 5.1 1.4 
 All Countries 365.4  
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Table 10 
New Zealand Wood, Exports of Wood, Wood Pulp 
and Paper & Paperboard 
(year ending June 1997, provisional statistics) 
 
Rank Country FOB 
($millions) 
% 
Share 
1 Japan 770.9 33.6 
2 Australia 554.4 24.2 
3 Korea 359.2 15.7 
4 U.S.A. 136.3 5.9 
5 Taiwan 89.3 3.9 
6 Indonesia 79.3 3.5 
7 Hong Kong 57.1 2.5 
8 Philippines 50.6 2.2 
9 Malaysia 37.0 1.6 
10 Thailand 34.0 1.5 
 All Countries 2,294.5  
 
 
Consequences of the Asian Economic Crisis 
 
In this section we explore the major consequences of the crisis for the New Zealand forestry 
industry. 
 
Mill Closure and Job Losses 
 
After a 35% drop in the price for sawn tim ber, Winstone Pulp International (W PI) closed its 
sawmill at Tangiwai resulting in 76 jobs being lost.  The mill had had a turnover of over $30 
million, 80% of which was exported, mainly to the United States and Asia.  Another factor 
contributing to this closure was a lack of capital for modernisation of the m ill.  Kerry Ellen 
WPI’s sawmilling divisional manager said that: 
 
Capital that the company’s owners had intended to invest in bringing the mill up to 
international standards is no longer available. … We had planned to spend another 
$6m to improve our competitiveness, but the group now doesn’t have that sort of 
capital available (The Press, 6 January 1998, p.21). 
 
To date it appears that no other major mill closures or job losses have occurred as a 
consequence of the crisis.   
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Harvesting and Processing Choices 
 
The crisis has also affected choices about when  to harvest trees and whether to process those 
trees into sawn timber.  Carter Holt Harvey’s CEO, Devon McLean, has said that the 
company will be processing more logs into sawn timber at its Eves Valley sawmill because of 
lower log export volumes (Clark, 1998, p.3). 
 
Reduction in Exports to Asian Countries  
 
The major impact on forestry so far has been  on log exports. The Timber Industry Federation 
predicted that log exports to South Korea might be half the levels of earlier in that year 
(around 400,000 cubic metres compared with 975,000 cubic metres in the June quarter).  
Fletcher Challenge Forests is among those co mpanies to be hurt by the crisis: on December 
26, 1997, the Dominion stated that: 
 
It was reported on Tuesday that consignments of logs were piling up at Mt Maunganui 
wharf after several South Korean  log orders were cancelled. A customer had been 
unable to obtain a letter of credit through the banking system , and Fletcher Challenge 
Forests was seeking other customers to take up the slack … The South Korean market 
made up about 20 per cent of Fletcher' s log exports from Mt Maunganui.  
 
This situation also shows that the crisis has flow-on effect for those associated with the 
forestry industry, in particular ports through which logs are exported.   
 
Investor Confidence 
 
In late 1997 John Groome, a spokesman for the Forestry Research Institute, warned investors 
in the forestry sector against overreacting to the Asian economic crisis (Dominion, 26 
December 1997, p.3).  This statement was made on the basis that investment in forestry 
tended to be a long-term  investment.  Because the market was expected to recover in about 
two years, smaller investors and forest owners who were under no immediate pressure to 
harvest had time on their side.  Com menting on radiada pine, Mr. Groome said that this tree 
did not have a ‘use by’ date: 
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Trees can be anything from 18 to 80 years old and still be gaining in size and value 
while they’re in the ground … the prospects fo r radiata pine log exports in the Pacific 
region are bright, with m any exporters aggressively diversifying and developing new 
markets.” (Dominion, 26 Dec, 1997, p.3).    
 
The Asian crisis has had an impact on share prices of forestry stocks listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange.  Anthony Davis, commenting on the share price performance of 
these companies, said that: 
 
For the week ending 29 January, Carter Ho lt Harvey was down 5% to $2.60, Fletcher 
Forests 8% to $1.27, Evergreen 9% to 42 cents, Nuhaka 9% to $10 and Opio 7% to 
85%.  With the exception of Carter Holt [which is the most diversified of these 
companies], all are either at or close to 12-month lows (Davies, 1998, p.30). 
 
At the end of February the share prices (cents) of these companies were: 
 
 Carter Holt Harvey      261 
 Fletcher Forests    127
 Evergreen       43
 Nuhaka   1050
 Opio        71 
 
 
Conclusion on Forestry 
 
The Asian economic crisis has had a major impact on the forestry industry.  This was 
inevitable given forestry’s heavy reliance on the Asian market.  In the shorter term  the crisis 
looks set to reduce the prices for forestry exports.  Nevertheless, longer-term  prospects look 
good for the industry.  As mentioned above, the Asian market is expected to recover in about 
two years.  In a recent address the Minister of Forests, Dr. Lockwood Smith, said that up to 
30,000 new jobs were likely to be created in the industry in the coming decades.  As one 
commentator states: “The tiimer industry is bleeding now, but all the experts predict a 
coming boom for our plantation grown wood as the world’s supply of timber from natural 
forests dwindles, and the Asian economies sort out their problems.” (Rooney, 1998). 
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Political and Security Effects 
 
The effects of the East Asian economic crisis on the regional economies themselves, and on 
New Zealand trade, investm ent, and the forestry  industry as described in earlier sections are 
measurable, however difficult  it may prove to read  all the trends. That the crisis is affecting 
political stability and security issues through riots and some deaths as well is demonstrable 
but the sequence of  cause and effect is harder to show and predictions even harder to make. 
The political and security aspects of the crisis were there from  the start though they were 
slower to become apparent than the financial and economic effects. They are certainly a valid 
part of any economic exam ination because they traditionally form  part of the country risk 
factors weighed by investors and developers. Yet they are more than a sideshow to the 
financial and economic mess. They have major impacts on bilateral and multilateral relations 
between and among countries which can last for many years. 
 
The political aspects appear to be working at two levels. The first is the unrest in various 
places and the threats that might pose to particular governments. That is the case in 
Indonesia, even though President Suharto will certainly become President for the seventh 
time during March. Forms of unrest can spread across borders. Malaysia made no fuss about 
it but recently returned to Thailand a Muslim  who has been working to create a Muslim State 
in the southern provinces of Thailand. But there is a more subtle effect at work as well. The 
governments of South-east Asia are generally authoritarian, drawing at least part of their 
legitimacy from their acceptance by their populations as economies have grown and provided 
more employment, wealth-making opportunities, and increased standards of living. If the 
governments are not in a position to point to those improvements in living, then their 
acceptance by their populations becomes far less assured. The situation of  citizens becoming 
alienated from  governments is familiar in democracies but there the Constitutional 
arrangements may be more immediately responsive to public concerns. In Indonesia, by 
contrast, President Suharto, who faces election (or perhaps more aptly, selection) by the 
People’s Consultative Assembly this month, is  bent on preserving his own power and the 
privileged position in the economy of members of his family and business acquaintance.  
In this f irst paper on the crisis political stability and security will be treated widely, rather 
than with a focus on any particular country. It should be noted that when the term  “security” 
is used it is to be understood in its wider sense that may include military security, but is in no 
way restricted to that meaning the wider sense of “security” is to be taken to mean a range of  
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situations, including uncontrolled mass migration, economic threats, ethnic unrest, threats to 
the apparatus of a state by criminal elements such as drug running, or even certain forms of 
disease. Of course not every criminal action threatens a state but when drug running, as it has 
occurred in some South American countries, invades the police, the civil service, the justice 
system, and the government itself then it may  prope rly be regarded as a security issue. If a 
disease become so ram pant that it interferes with, say, the ability of a country to recruit for the 
Armed Forces, then that can properly be described as a security issue.  
 
Below is a discussion of  some of the political stability and security issues which have come 
to the fore during the East Asian economic crisis.  
 
Repatriation 
 
A number of countries plan to send illegal or foreign workers to their countries of origin. 
Thailand intends to repatriate 300,000 illegal workers. It is also expected that the Thai Social 
Welfare Ministry will not renew work permits for registered foreign workers (Hutasingh, 
1998). 
 
Malaysia plans to repatriate 1 million foreign workers. Thailand’s and Malaysia’s aims are to 
provide work opportunities for their own citizens. 
 
Repatriation on such a large scale can produce problems for the home country which has to 
deal with a large influx adding to the unemployed. Burma is likely to be worst affected by 
Thailand’s action. It is yet to be seen how Burma’s military rulers will treat those who are 
returned. But Burm a has been a traditional exporter of labour and its capacity to provide work 
for those returning is severely limited.  Of all the South-East Asian countries, however, the 
Philippines will suffer most because of the huge number if its citizens working abroad. Most 
of the foreign workers Malaysia will send home are Indonesians (Skehan, 1998). This will 
add to the already 8 million Indonesia already admits are unemployed (Lague, 1998). Some 
reports put Indonesia’s figure for the unemployed and the under-em ployed as high as 40 
million.  
 21
The unemployed of several countries threaten political stability. It can also produce problem  
for the repatriating country as pressure on borders mounts. Thailand has not been able to 
control the influx in the past (Hutasingh, 1998). It may be expected to come under even 
greater pressure. Another problem  for the country which has to take its citizens back is that 
the workers will no longer be sending remittances home.  
 
Secessionist Movements 
 
Secessionist movements in East Asia did not begin with the economic crisis but the crisis has 
given them greater force and is complicating relations among countries. The Muslim  
insurgency on the southern Philippines island of Mindanao has a long history. One group, the 
Moro National Liberation front, made peace with Manila in 1996 but the Moro Islamic  
Liberation Front still aims to make parts of Mindanao an Islamic state (Toiglao, 1998). 
As the Philippines Government becomes increasingly drawn into trying to resolve its 
financial problems, it will become harder for it to deal with the already conf ident separatists. 
The movement now considers that it is as well armed as the Government troops. The 
movement for an independent Muslim  State made up of several southern Thailand provinces 
has already been mentioned.  
 
Ethnic and Religious Issues 
 
Ethnic issues form one of the biggest threats to political stability. The memories of communal 
violence in Indonesia (1965-1966) and in Malaysia (1969) are still alive. In Indonesia about 
half a m illion people, mostly of Chinese origin died during the violence of 1965 and 1966. 
Chinese form only 3 per cent of the Indonesia’s 200 m illion population, but they control a 
disproportionate number of the businesses. Chin ese shops and other businesses have recently 
been attacked by Indonesians blaming the Chinese for the fierce price rises. A few deaths 
have occurred. Middle-class Chinese have observed the general unwillingness of the 
Indonesian security forces to intervene to protect Chinese businesses. Added to that have 
been public appeals for Chinese to repatriate overseas assets. Chinese fears have been further 
fuelled by the harassment of Sofjan Wanandi, the informal spokesman for Chinese business 
interests in Indonesia. Wanandi is a member of a very prominent Indonesian family. One 
brother, Jusuf, is chairman of the supervisory board  of a renowned think-tank, the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, and another brother is notable Catholic clergyman. The  
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occasional incident in Indonesia involves the incitement of racial hatred. A fundamental fear 
of many liberals, Chinese, and non-Muslims in Indonesia is that Indonesia will abandon 
secular politics. 
 
A disturbing aspect of the violence in Indonesia has been the reluctance of the security 
authorities to act against those threatening Chinese. The Armed Forces, apparently now think 
it is safer to break their link with the Chinese business community. While more developments 
will have to occur before it becom es clear what is happening, one explanation is that because 
Abri, the Armed Forces, back President Suharto for President, they want to deflect attention 
away from  themselves, and from the President, by distancing themselves from  Chinese 
business interests. Previously their link had been profitable to Abri. In many ways, the sooner 
such links are broken the better, but in the present circunstances, where the very small 
Chinese minority is under threat, Abri’s action is cause  for concern.  
 
If  violence becomes widespread in Indonesia several basic security issues will come to the 
fore. The com mander of United States Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Joseph Prueher, in a 
public statement, has expressed concern about the social unrest and the threat that m ight pose 
to secure passage through the Malacca Straits. Australia and Papua New Guinea would have 
to worry about whether they would have to cope with refugees from  the unrest. Australia is 
playing a role in trying to persuade President Suharto to accept the conditions of the IMF.  
Within Malaysia the corporates are promoting racial harmony. Corporate-sponsored 
advertisements showing people of different ethnic groups adopting one another’s customs or 
songs are being screened on television. During a week in which there were important Chinese 
and Islamic festivals, restaurants and hotels featured Malay and Chinese figures in a common 
celebration. One observer found many analysts assuming that the economic crisis would 
result in racial disharmony (Sheridan, 1998). 
 
The Rich and the Poor 
 
The economic crisis cannot help but make the division between rich and poor greater. The 
World Bank has focused on this issue and expressed concern about the possibility of social 
unrest and the way in which this might undermine economic recovery. James Wolfensohn, 
president of the World Bank, who toured Asia in early February, gave a warning that social 
conflict would flare if the needs of the poor were not addressed. He observed urban workers  
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returning to villages creating strains on resources.  The World Bank has come up with 
$US300 million for the crisis as a social safety net (Vatikiotis, 1998). 
 
The crisis is bound to last during the period China reforms its State-owned enterprises. One 
estimate of the number made unemployed by those changes is 11 million. As always the scale 
in China practically defies comprehension. The extent to which the issue of  unemployment 
throughout Asia will be a major factor of instability will bear watching.  
 
Arms Sales 
 
The accumulation of armas by South-east Asian nations throughout the 1990s has been 
remarked on often and been the subject of considerable analysis. Although precise 
information is not yet easily available, there is some evidence that this has come abruptly to 
an end. The accumulation was never a traditional arms race. Several factors played a part. 
One was the movement by South-east Asians to r econfigure their defence forces for external 
needs instead of for  the internal needs which dominated their arms buying during the period 
of insurgencies. Another was that the nations were richer. A third was that arms were cheap 
in the post-Cold war years. The ends of arms control might be well served by an end to the 
extensive buying. However, despite the accumulation not being part of an arms race, one 
nation kept an eye on what another was acquiring and an abrupt end to the buying might have 
left one or more nations feeling nervous because they did not have weaponry to match that of 
a neighbour. The implications of any imbalance (or the perception of such an imbalance) will 
take some time to become apparent. 
 
Long-Term Effects 
 
The econom ic crisis m ay have effects on political stability and security issues which will 
outlast the crisis itself. Those effects might delay economic recovery. Som e States, notably 
Indonesia, are already hard hit but  political in stability and security issues m ay spread across 
borders. Much will depend on the depth and length of  the crisis. There will be financial 
opportunists who will find ways of turning the crisis to their economic advantage but there 
will also be political opportunists who will seek to change borders or to seize economic 
power not for the betterment of the nation or the region but to further their own ethnic or 
religious ends.  
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Conclusion 
 
The section  on the causes of the economic crisis in Asia disclosed a variety of factors 
affecting different countries but they had in common the effects of  the devaluations of the 
early 1990s.  Although  the extensive realignments of the currencies in the last few months 
and the IMF loans to Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea have brought an interim  measure 
of greater stability, any further major devaluations might cause wild swings in Asia again. 
They might also cause the crisis itself to spread further, as opposed to the effects of the crisis, 
which are already being felt widely. The globalised economy exposes the individual country 
to the effects of a severe crisis  as well as conferring the advantages of freedom  for  trade and 
movement of capital. In the section on the effect on New Zealand industry, the impact on 
forestry is shown to have been severe, affecting both exports and the share prices of 
companies. Yet each sector of the economy needs analysis, not an assumption that all parts of 
the economy will be badly affected. The section dealing with political stability and security 
issues shows that social unrest has been increasing and ethnic and religious issues have reared 
up. They might not easily be quietened. Yet Asia has changed much in the last few decades 
and those who forget its resilience judge it badly. The stripes on the tigers may have faded but 
not disappeared.  
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